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A Test of the Credit and
Portfolio Effects
DEFINITION OF CREDIT AND MONEY
According to the credit theory of money, the growth of bank credit, for
which growth of the total money stock is simply a good proxy, is the
source of monetary effects on interest rates. The test presented in this
chapter is based upon distinguishing the contribution of an expansion
of credit from that of other components of monetary growth. Regres-
sion analysis is then used to estimate their separate effects on interest
rates.
On the consolidated balance sheet of the monetary system, credit is
represented by net earning assets—funds lent to the public. Currency
issues and deposits are monetary liabilities. For individual banks,
changes in total credit and deposits are closely related, though not
identical because other items enter the two sides of the balance sheet.
In the aggregate, changes in the money stock and in the net earning
assets of banks and the government are generally not closely related.
Table 4-1 shows how the credit items are related to the money stock
in a condensed balance sheet. Nonfinancial assets and liabilities are
omitted. The money stock in the hands of the public comprises de-
posits with commercial banks (16) plus currency outside banks (lines
6+ 9 —13).'Credit supplied to the public by the monetary system is
represented by net earning assets (lines 2 + 14 + 15 —10).In a corn-
'The minor amount of Treasury currency in vaults of Federal Reserve banks can be
treated as a deduction from Federal Reserve notes outstanding.62 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
plete consolidation of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury with
commercial banks, certain items cancel: loans to banks (3 and 19),
member bank reserves (4 and 11), interbank deposits (12 and 17), and
Treasury deposits (7 and 8 against 5 and 18). The remaining item
TABLE 4-1
CondensedBalance Sheet of Monetary and Credit Items of Federal Reserve
Banks, U.S. Treasury, and Commercial Banks
Assets Liabilities
A. Federal Reserve Banks
1. Gold reserve Deposits of:
Earning assets: 4. Commercial banks
2 Securities 5. U.S. Treasury




7. Federal Reserve Banks 9. Net currency
8. Commercial banks 10. Securities outside government
agencies
C. Commercial Banks
Deposits with: Deposits (less bank float) of:
11. Federal Reserve Banks 16. Public
12. Other commercial banks 17. Other commercial banks
13. Vault cash 18. U.S. Treasury
Earning assets: 19. Due to Federal Reserve banks
14. Loans
1 5. Investments
Monetary liabilities =6+ 9 —13+ 16
Net earning assets
Consolidated monetary system= 2 + 14+ 15— 10
Banking system excluding Treasury =2+ 14 + 15
Federal Reserve banks =2+ 3
Commercial banks 14 + 15 —19
uIncludingnote liabilities of national banks before the notes were retired in 1935.A Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 63
shown, the gold reserve (I), represents the reserves of the monetary
system under the international gold standard.
The money stock and net earning assets are not identical. The dif-
ference is due not only to the noncanceling gold reserve but also to the
numerous nonfinancial items not shown. Thus, gold flows stem from
the international payments mechanism, only part of which entails debt
issue; Treasury deposits help absorb short-run discrepancies between
federal budget receipts and expenditures and trust funds, whose opera-
tions only in part involve credit transactions with the public; andother
liabilities of the banking system represent a miscellany of operations
which can affect the money stock and earning assets differently.
Loans made by the Treasury under various federal programs are not
included in the credit total. Such loans are treated as though they were
ordinary expenditures, as many of them are. In recent years Treasury
lending has increased sharply through such agencies as the Federal
National Mortgage Association (which was made a private corporation
outside the federal budget in 1968). Fortunately, they are not im-
portant for the period covered here, and their exclusion can be passed
over.
The Treasury could be excluded altogether (except for adding
Treasury currency—line 9—to Federal Reserve notes—line 6); the
effect of that alternative treatment will be discussed later. But deduct-
ing Treasury securities outstanding—line 10—from the earning assets
of the banking system seems desirable in order to allow for transactions
between the Treasury and the banking system which have no effect on
the public. For example, if the Treasury sells a bond to commercial
banks and deposits the proceeds in one of its commercial bank ac-
counts, the money stock and the borrowing of the public are unaffected
by the bookkeeping of this transaction; yet investments and the total
credit of banks have increased, if we deduct Treasury securities out-
standing, however, total credit available to the public is unchanged,
as is proper. A similar example could be given involving bond transac-
tions between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
In this treatment of Treasury debt operations, it is also true that a
budget deficit financed by selling bonds to the public reduces total
credit available to the public without affecting the money stock. Such64 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
CHART 4-1
Reference Cycle Patterns of Growth in the Money Stock and in Net Earning
Assets of the Consolidated Monetary System, 1948—66
Netearning assets
Money stock
Per cent per year
Source:Dataappendix.For definition of variables, see Table 4-I.A Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 65
debtoperations contribute to differences between changes in money
and in credit.
Chart 4-1 shows reference cycle patterns of monthly changes in net
earning assets and the money stock as defined above, both expressed
as percentages of the money stock. The chart covers the period since
CHART 4-2
Comparison of Growth in the Money Stock and in Net
Earning Assets of the Consolidated Monetary System,
Changes Between Reference Cycle Stages, 1948—66
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Source; Data appendix.For definition of variables, see Table 4-1.66 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
1948 for which monthly data for all commercial banks are available.
The patterns are certainly highly similar, as we might expect, but the
movements are not identical. The degree of covariation is shown by
Chart 4-2, a scatter diagram of the stage-to-stage changes in each
series. The correlation coefficient for the scatter is .42, indicative of
considerable divergence. This shows that it is possible to distinguish
the two variables statistically.
REGRESSION TEST OF THE TWO SOURCES
OF MONETARY GROWTH
Conceivably we observe monetary growth to be associated with
interest rates simply because it approximates, however imperfectly,
the growth in credit. Interest rates depend upon the growth of credit
insofar as the first-round effects of extending credit are important, and
on growth of the total money stock insofar as money creation itself is
important. A regression equationto test these effects is
i=f3(dE)+/i(dM—dE), (1)
where I is the interest rate, E is net earning assets of the monetary sys-
tem, M is the money stock as defined above, and d denotes changes in
the variables. /3 andare coefficients: their value is a measure of the
effect of monetary growth due to credit expansion (J3) and all other
sources @).Theoretically,/3andj..t may be zero or negative. Ifis
zero, the residual sources have no effect on interest rates, and the en-
tire effect of monetary growth can be attributed to credit effects. If
both coefficients are negative and equal, the two sources of monetary
growth have the same effect on interest rates. Credit expansion then
plays no separate role, and the entire effect can be attributed to the
portfolio effect as described in Chapter 1. For credit to have a separate
additional effect, /3 —must be significantly negative.2
In the remainder of this chapter, estimates of these coefficients are
presented.
2Jf13 —p.were significantly positive, it would mean that monetary growth had less
effect on interest rates when produced through credit expansion. This would not be
consistent with either the credit or the portfolio theory.A Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 67
PROBLEMS OF THE DATA
To estimate equation 1, the series on monetary growth usedin the
previous chapter were supplemented by data on the earning assets of
the monetary system. Monthly Federal Reserve earning assets exclu-
sive of loans to banks have been reported since 1914, and a monthly
series for Treasury securities outstanding was also available. Asset
data for all commercial banks, unfortunately, were not available on a
monthly basis before World War II. There were data for all commer-
cial banks annually since 1896 and monthly since 1948. The only ear-
lier monthly data pertained to weekly reporting member banks since
1919. Reporting member banks have accounted for about half of total
earning assets of all commercial banks.
Using reporting member banks to represent all commercial banks
tends to reduce the size and significance of the coefficient of the credit
variable. We may assess the size of the misrepresentation from Chart
4-3. The chart presents a scatter diagram of the stage-to-stage changes
in credit growth, as used in the subsequent regressions, of all commer-
cial banks and of reporting member banks for 1948—66, which the for-
mer data cover. The correlation coefficient is .92. It is high, both be-
cause reporting member banks are a good proxy for all commercial
banks and because commercial banks contribute only one part of total
credit along with the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. Since it ex-
ceeds the .42 correlation between credit and monetary growth for the
same period (Chart 4-2), it suggests that the series for reporting mem-
ber banks can be run with the money series to distinguish satisfactorily
the effects on interest rates of credit and monetary growth. The statis-
tical analysis therefore uses the reporting member bank data for the
period since 1919. The errors due to misrepresentation are probably
not negligible, however, so the series for all commercial banks, though
available monthly only since 1948 and prior to that only annually, is
also used in separate regressions as a check on the proxy series. Ac-
tually, the different data give similar results.
STATISTICAL RESULTS
Table 4-2 presents the three sets of regressions. To express the inde-
pendent variables as growth rates, they have been divided by the68 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
CHART 4-3
Growth in Net Earning Assets of the Consolidated Monetary System, Com-
parison Using Weekly Reporting Members and All Commercial Banks,
Changes Between Reference Cycle Stages, 1948—66
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Source: Data appendix.For definition of variables,seeTable 4-I.A Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 69
money stock. Thus, equation 1 becomes
i=/3(dE/M)+14dM/M— dEIM]. (2)
The regressions of reference cycle stages exclude, as before, the war
contractions and 1929—33, and the regressions of annual data also ex-
clude all the war years 1940—46. The monetary and credit changes are
so large during those years that their inclusion would dominate the an-
nual regressions. The war years are unimportant in the reference stage
regressions and need not be excluded, since they affect only part of one
reference expansion. The regressions including dummy variables for
cycle stages (as described in the appendix to Chapter 3) are discussed
later.
All the regressions were made comparable to those in the previous
chapter by taking first differences of equation 2 and adding a constant
term not given in the table (see the note to Table 4-2). The de-
pendent variable, therefore, is the stage-to-stage or annual change in
the level of interest rates, and the independent variables are stage-to-
stage changes in the average monthly rate of change (as in Chart 4-2)
or year-to-year changes in the annual rate of change. The unit of
measurement for the interest rates is the change per stage or per year
in basis points (one hundredth of a percentage point); for the inde-
pendent variables, it is the change per stage or per year in the monthly
or annual rate of change, all expressed as the change in an annual per-
centage rate. A regression coefficient of —10, say, indicates that an
increase of one percentage point in the annual growth rate would re-
duce interest rates by ten basis points.
In all the regressions the credit effect on interest rates (as indicated
by the negative value of the difference between the coefficients) is
generally from about 10 to 40 per cent of the effect ofmonetary growth
given byTheonly larger credit effects are shown by two of the re-
gressions for corporate and municipal bonds and two for annual
changes in government securities. But in general the differences are not
statistically significant (their tvaluesare nearly all less then 2.0).
The large credit coefficient for corporate and municipal bond yields
in the 1948—66 period is anomalous and may be disregarded since its
statistical significance is low. The relatively large credit coefficients
for bill and bond yields in the annual changes, however, can be given70 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
TABLE 4-2
Relation Between Interest Rates and Two Sources of Monetary Growth,





















Changes Between Reference Cycle Stages
19 19—66
Commercial paper —5.2—4.3(3.4)—0.9(1.1) NO.43
—5.0 —4.4(3.8)—0.6(0.9) YES.67
Treasury bills —6.2—4.4(3.3)—1.8(2.0) NO.49
—6.3—5.0(4.4)—1.2(1.7) YES.75
U.S. bonds —2.2—2.1(4.0)—0.1(0.3) NO.45
—2.1 —2.1(3.7)—0.0(0.1) YES.55
Corp. and municipal bonds —2.9—2.5(1.3)—0.4(0.3) NO.17
—1.7—1.3(0.6)—0.4(0.3) YES.34
1948—66
Commercial paper —12.7—12.4(3.1)—0.3(0.2) NO.55
—6.7 —5.6(2.1)—1.2(1.2) .90
Treasury bills —13.7—13.3(3.3)—0.5(0.3) NO.58
—8.2—6.9(2.6)—1.3(1.3) YES.91
U.S. bonds —3.8 —3.7(2.5)—0.1(0.2) NO.47
—1.6—1.2(1.3)—0.4(1.2) YES.90




Commercial paper —9.4 —7.9(3.0)—1.5(0.6) NO.68
Treasury billse —11.5 —7.0(2.6)—4.4(1.4) NO.60
U.S. bonds —3.0 —0.6(0.5)—2.4(2.2) NO.56
Corp. and municipal bonds —2.7—1.1(1.0)—1.6(1.4) NO.52
Note: These regressions are first differences of equation 2 in the text:
= + jth[(dM/M) —(dEIM)]+ constant
(continued)A Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 71
Notes toTable 4-2 (concluded)
wherei is the interest rate; M, total money stock; and E, net earning assets of monetary
system as defined in Table 4-I. E pertains to all commercial banks for reference stages
1948—61 and for annual changes, and to weekly reporting member banks for reference
stages 1919—66. f3 andare regression coefficients. The operatordenotes first dif-
ferences of reference-cycle stage average or of annual data.
For computation, all the regressions were run in the statistically equivalent form:
=(j3 — + + constant
in order to obtain the tvalueof the difference between the regression coefficients.
In the regressions so indicated, seven dummy variables were added, one for each
stage-to-stage change but the last. For each stage change, the corresponding dummy
variable was unity and the rest were zero. The regression coefficients of the dummy
variables (not shown) are estimates of the average change in interest rates between each
pair of stages relative to the average change for the omitted pair.
Source: See the data appendix.
aThe 1919—66 regressions begin with the 1919 reference trough and end with an as-
sumed business peak in December 1966, except for the Treasury bill series, which begins
with the 1920 peak. Excluded stages are the same as for Table 3-1. The 1948—66 regres-
sions begin with the 1948 reference peak, end with the 1966 peak, and have no inter-
vening exclusions. The annual regressions cover the years indicated, excluding the ten
annUal changes 1929—33 and 1940—46.
tiUnitsof regression coefficients are interest-rate change in basis points for increase in
monetary growth rate of one percentage point per year (100 basis points equals I per-
centage point). Figures in parentheses are tvalueswith signs omitted.
Cvalues were not computed for credit variable.
of rounding, differences shown may not be the same as differences com-
puted from the figures shown in the first two columns. Figures in parentheses are t
valueswith signs omitted.
Begins 1920.
a special explanation: They result from the inclusion of Treasury debt;
when the Treasury debt is excluded, as is done later in Table 4-3, they
fall more in line with the other regressions. Treasury debt issues can
be expected to influence the government security market, and the effect
may carry over to corporate and municipal bonds as well. The greater
credit effect shows up mainly in the annual regressions, probably be-
cause the security market anticipates Treasury deficits ahead of time,
and the annual observations cover a long enough time span to in-
corporate the anticipations of, as well as the actual, Treasury issues in
one observation. The reference stages, on the other hand, are probably
too short to incorporate both, if the anticipations tend to lead the actual
Treasury issues by several months or more.72 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
Explanations for some of the other differences between the three
sets of regressions can also be suggested. First, the effect of both
variables is generally weaker on bond yields, as was found in Chap-
ter 3. This simply reflects the longer maturity of bonds and the smaller
amplitude of fluctuation of their yields. Bond yields typically respond
slowly to short-run influences. These results do not show, therefore,
that monetary and credit effects have their first impact in the markets
for short-term funds. This question is taken up in Chapter 5.Second,
both regression coefficients are smaller (in absolute size) for the top set
covering the full 19 19—66 period, which suggests that the association
between money and interest rates was weaker in the earlier period.
Even so, fJ— p.is on the average about the same for 1948—66 as for
19 19—66, implying that the weekly reporting member bank data used
for the longer period are not seriously deficient for the purposes of
these regressions. Third, both coefficients are larger (in absolute size)
for the annual regressions than for the 19 19—66 reference regressions,
probably because the monetary effect on interest rates is distributed
over time and the annual observations encompass more of it. This is
supported by the time of the effect, discussed in Chapter 7.
Aside from these minor differences, this evidence taken as a whole
shows that new money affects interest rates no matter how it enters the
economy, though it has an additional, marginal effect when it is created
by an expansion of credit.
Common Cyclical Patterns
In the final stages of business upswings, when borrowers clamor for
credit, banks may often be able, despite Federal Reserve efforts to re-
strain monetary growth, to expand total credit temporarily by reducing
their reserve ratios; and, conversely, in business recessions, when
loan demand contracts, banks may allow, credit growth to taper off
(total credit may even decline temporarily) by increasing their reserve
ratios. This behavior over the business cycle might affect credit
growth more than monetary growth. Demand deposits would increase
commensurately with the credit expansion, but time deposits and cur-
rency might not. As a result of such shifts in the demand curve for
loans along the supply curve of bank credit (for a given amount of re-
serves), the regression coefficient of the credit component, intended toA Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 73
show the negative slope of a given demand curve by means of shifts in
supply, could be pulled toward zero and so be understated.
There is a simple test of this possibility. As a first approximation we
may assume that shifts in the demand curve for bank loans occur in
consonance with the stages of the business cycle, inasmuch as those
shifts and business activity are usually highly correlated. We may
then add dummy variables for the stage-to-stage changes, as described
in the appendix to Chapter 3. Each stage change of the variables is
thereby converted into a deviation from its average change in those
stages. The partial regression coefficients for the independent variables
in such regressions are largely independent of cyclical influences.
The estimates are presented in Table 4-2 along with the regressions
already discussed. For the full period 19 19—66, the dummy variables
tend to reduce the credit effect relative to the portfolio effect and, for
the 1948—66 period, to increase it. Although this may be no more than
a statistical accident, it may reflect a difference in economic behavior.
Monetary policy since World War II has produced greater inverse
cyclical conformity in monetary growth than formerly, and interest
rates have for a variety of reasons displayed greater conformity. As a
result, the dummy variables in the later period may absorb relatively
more of the common fluctuation between monetary growth and
interest rates than between credit growth and interest rates.
Of course, by affecting the variables differently the dummy variables
may produce misleading estimates. There is no easy way to tell which
estimates are more reliable. We may best conclude that the true values
probably lie somewhere between the two sets of estimates shown in
Table 4-2. By either set the portfolio effect is clearly quite strong, while
the credit component has an uncertain additional effect.
Exclusion of Treasury Debt Operations
As explained above, Treasury debt operations were consolidated
with the banking system in Table 4-2 in order to cancel out transac-
tions not involving the public, such as the sale of Treasury securities
to the banking system. It is proper that such a transaction not affect the
credit variable, because the transaction by itself does not affect total
credit supplied to the public.
If banks reduce loans to the public to make room for the purchase74 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
of Treasury securities, that is equivalent for present purposes to a sale
of Treasury securities to the public. In a sale to the public the credit
variable is reduced. The logic of this procedure is that such a sale re-
duces the supply of credit —shiftingthe supply curve —availableto pri-
vate borrowers. This procedure implicitly assumes that Treasury debt
operations reflect a shift in the supply curve rather than a movement
along it. It assumes, in other words, that the operation affects interest
rates but is not affected by them. The assumption may not be entirely
valid since the supply of Treasury securities may partly depend in-
versely upon interest rates. To avoid the need to rely on this assump-
tion in testing the credit theory, the regressions were rerun with Treas-
ury debt operations excluded by following the alternative definition
given in Table 4-1.
The results with the credit variable now covering just the Federal
Reserve and commercial banks are about the same (Table 4-3). The
residual monetary growth is somewhat less significant in most regres-
sions here than in Table 4-2, and the credit effect is relatively larger,
except for corporate and municipal bonds in the later period and, as
noted earlier, for the annual regressions, though the differences are
still not significant. The credit effect ranges up to one-half of the port-
folio effect, and in one case —commercialpaper 1948—66—up to three-
quarters.
The larger difference between these coefficients than between those
in Table 4-2 could mean that it is inappropriate to include Treasury
operations and that the true credit effect is indeed larger with the ex-
clusion. On that interpretation Treasury debt operations are not en-
tirely independent of interest rates and act as an extraneous element
in the regressions. Yet, as noted, that is not true for the annual regres-
sions. Furthermore, since the effect of excluding Treasury debt is
greater for the 1948—66 period, another interpretation is more appeal-
ing. It is that Treasury debt, especially the short-term bills issued in
such large volume after World War II, is a partial money substitute and
should be added (presumably with a weight less than unity) to mone-
tary liabilities rather than wholly deducted from earning assets of the
monetary system. In that case, Treasury debt was inappropriately
treated in Table 4-2, and its exclusion in Table 4-3 partially removed
its biased effect on the credit variable, but also removed its effect fromA Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 75
TABLE 4-3
Relation Between Interest Rates and Two Sources of Monetary Growth,












Changes Between Reference Cycle Stages
1919—66
Commercial paper —5.5—3.8(2.8)—1.7(1.4) NO.44
—5.2—4.1(3.2)—1.2(1.0) YES.67
Treasury bills —6.1 —4.2(2.9)—1.8(1.4) NO.46
—6.2 —4.8(3.8)—1.4(1.2) YES.74
U.S. bonds —2.5 —1.8(3.1)—0.7(1.3) NO.47
—2.4—1.7(2.9)—0.6(1.2) YES.56
Corp. and municipal bonds—2.6 —2.8(1.3)+0.2(0.1) NO.16
—1.4—1.6(0.7)+0.1(0.1) YES.33
1948—66
Commercial paper —13.5—10.0(2.5)—3.5(1.4) NO.58
—7.8 —4.6(1.8)—3.3(1.9) YES.91
Treasury bills —14.4—11.4(2.8)—3.1(1.2) NO.60
—9.0 —7.0(2.6)—2.0(1.1) YES.90
U.S. bonds —3.9—3.3(2.2)—0.6(0.6) NO.48
—1.7 —1.5(1.6)—0.2(0.3) YES.89




Commercial paper —9.2 —7.8(2.6)—1.4(0.5) NO.68
Treasury bills —9.8 —7.8(2.4)—2.0(0.7) NO.58
U.S. bonds —2.6 —8.7(0.7)—1.8(1.4) NO.52
Corp. and municipal bonds —2.4—1.6(1.2)—0.8(0.7) NO.49
Source and notes: Same as for Table 4-2.76 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
the money variable and thus reduced the measured monetary effect.
In either case, the main conclusion is unchanged: Money created by
whatever means affects interest rates and the credit effect is only a
fraction of the portfolio effect.
SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT AND
COMMERCIAL BANKS
In Chapter 2 it was argued that the beneficiaries of private money
creation may strive to maintain some desired ratio of their imputed
net worth to consumption. In doing so, they would largely offset addi-
tions to their imputed net worth due to credit expansion by banks and
thus largely negate the effect of that expansion on the total supply of
credit and thus on interest rates. This argument does not apply to
government money creation, however. To whatever extent stock-
holders and depositors of commercial banks behave in that manner,
taxpayers of the government would not necessarily behave similarly
in response to government money creation. Government money
created in lieu of debt issues has a much less certain effect on the dis-
counted value of future taxes for debt servicing than money created by
a commercial bank has on its net worth. It follows that money creation
through credit expansion by the government may have a greater effect
on interest rates than that of commercial banks. Combining the two
sectors therefore dilutes the measured credit effect of the government.
In Table 4-4, this proposition is tested by dividing the credit variable
into two components, one for commercial banks and one for the
Federal Reserve. Loans to banks by the Federal Reserve now do not
cancel, since there is no consolidation of the two sectors; these loans
are treated as credit extended by the Federal Reserve and are de-
ducted from the credit of commercial banks. Also, to avoid the possi-
bility of underestimating the credit effect here, the Treasury is ex-
cluded. In terms of Table 4-1, commercial bank creditis loans (line
14) plus investments (line 15) minus loans from Federal Reserve
Banks (line 19). Federal Reserve credit EF is earning assets (lines 2 +
3). The regression equation has three independent variables:
i =13c(c1Ec/M)+ J3p(dEp/M) + 14(dM — — (3)
The proposition to be tested is whether —13c isnegative.A Test of the Credit and Portfolio Effects 77
Generally, the proposition is supported by the test. With the inclu-
sion of dummy variables, which, as explained above, tends to remove
the response of bank credit to cycles in the private demand for credit,
the effect of Federal Reserve credit is greater than the effect of com-
mercial bank credit; and even without the dummy variables, Federal
Reserve credit has the greater effect more often than not. (A puzzling
exception is U.S. bond yields in the annual regressions. Perhaps this is
an accident; I have no ready explanation.)
While consistent with the theory, this evidence is still no more than
suggestive for two reasons. First, the differential effect of Federal Re-
serve credit is significantly greater by the ttestin only two regres-
sions, those with dummy variables for commercial paper and Treasury
bill rates, 1919—66. And, second, when Treasury debt operations are
consolidated with the Federal Reserve to form a variable of total
government credit (not shown), these differences largely disappear.
CONCLUSIONS
The theories outlined in Chapter 1 imply that monetary growth affects
interest rates inversely through portfolio adjustments and has an addi-
tional effect if created through credit expansion. In Chapter 2 it was
argued that the credit effect is likely to be strongest for government
money creation and to be temporary and. uncertain for commercial
bank money creation. In some monetary literature, on the other hand,
the credit effect is viewed as the only or the main short-run monetary
effect on interest rates.
This chapter presented a test of these propositions. Interest rates
were regressed on two parts of monetary growth, one set representing
credit expansion of commercial banks and the government, and a
residual part representing allother sources of monetary growth.
Credit was measured by growth in the earning assets of commercial
banks, the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury. In some regressions all
three were consolidated, in some just the former two with the Treasury
excluded; and in some of these, commercial bank and Federal Reserve
credit were treated as separate variables.
The results clearly indicated that monetary growth affects interest


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.80 The Channels of Monetary Effects on Interest Rates
expansion, however, the effect is greater generally by about 10 to 40
per cent, though several estimates fall beyond that range. But only a
few of the credit coefficients are statistically significant. Federal
Reserve credit treated separately apparently has a larger effect than
commercial bank credit. While the magnitude of the credit effect is
somewhat uncertain and marginal, the portfolio effect is strong and
uniformly statistically significant.
These results pertain to the relative effects in the time span of the
observations, that is from a few to many months for reference stages
and to a year for the annual regressions. For shorter periods the credit
effect may be relatively larger; for longer periods it is very likely even
s mailer.
Since bank credit is a sum of bank loans and investments, the effect
of one of the components on interest rates may be even greater than
the estimated effect of both together. This possibility is examined in
Chapter 5.